Equitable Servitudes On Chattels by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 10
Fall 3-1-1960
Equitable Servitudes On Chattels
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Equitable Servitudes On Chattels, 17 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 272 (1960),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol17/iss2/10
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol.XVII
withdraWn for reasons which would not be legally sufficient to justi-
fy the cancellation of a contract involving other rights or different
relationships." 28 This indicates an advantage over both the majority
and minority theories in that under the intermediate theory, once the
initial petition is filed, the judge is not restricted by any contract or
written agreement made by the respective parties and-if it is in the
best interest of the child 29-can return the child to the mother. The
case further points out that by allowing the mother to withdraw
consent at her discretion, the majority view makes it possible for the
natural parent to extort money from the adoptive parents by threat-
ening to revoke her consent. If, instead, the withdrawal of consent
is made discretionary, this greatly lessens the opportunity to per-
petrate fraud of this nature.
3 0
The majority in the Hendrix case based its decision on the fact
that it would better serve the welfare of the child to have the adoption
petition granted, which essentially constituted an exercise of discretion
after consideration of all the evidence in the case. Thus, among the
three commonly used theories, it would seem that the discretionary
theory is the best suited to serve the interests of society. Once the
natural mother has given her free and voluntary consent, the court
should have jurisdiction over the entire matter. The court can then
consider all the facts and circumstances of the particular case and
make the disposition which is best for the child and fairest to the
respective parties. The Uniform Adoption Act of 195331 takes a po-
sition tantamount to the discretionary trend, thereby lending sub-
stantial support to its validity.
FRANK A. Hoss, JR.
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES ON CHATTELS
Since the middle of the nineteenth century owners of land have
been allowed to restrict its use in the hands of remote transferees in
order to protect certain interests therein. Producers of chattels have
sought to develop a similar, though more flexible device,' which will
-id. at 94.
2"See Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955); Adoption of Mc-
Kenzie, 275 S.V.2d 365 (Mo. App. 1955).
m'See In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
"'Uniform Adoption Act § 6 (1953).
'This device has generally taken the shape of one of five kinds of restrictions:
restrictions on the resale price, restrictions on the form of the chattel's container,
ig6o] CASE COMMENTS 273
allow them to control their goods in the hands of intervening dealers
so as to insure that the product reaches the public as advertised. Such
restrictions of servitudes have generally proved to be unenforceable
in the courts. However, in the recent case of Nadell & Co. v. Grasso,
2
an equitable servitude on a chattel was enforced.
The plaintiff, Nadell 8: Co., was a dealer in damaged goods who
purchased a quantity of damaged Kraft brand fruit salad from the
Southern Pacific railroad. In order to avoid involvement with Kraft,
whose name appeared on the lids of the container, Southern Pacific
required plaintiff to agree not to sell, or allow others to sell, the
damaged merchandise under the Kraft label. It was understood that
a violation of this provision would end business relations between
plaintiff and Southern Pacific. Plaintiff sold the entire shipment to one
Vizcarra who agreed to use his own containers and return Kraft's
to the plaintiff.
3
Ross, an employee of Nadell, participated in both transactions. He
assisted Nadell's vice-president in the sale to Vizcarra, and knew of
both the restriction placed on the sale by Nadell, and the private agree-
ment between Nadell and Southern Pacific. Soon after the sale Ross
left Nadell's employ, bought the goods from Vizcarra, and sold some
in the Kraft containers, disregarding the restrictions. This suit was
brought by Nadell to enjoin Ross and his associates from future sales.
In affirming the injunction granted by the lower court, the California
District Court of Appeals decided the restriction was analogous to a
restriction on the use of land, and held that an enforceable equitable
servitude on the goods had been created by the contract between
Nadell and Vizcarra, and that the restriction was valid against subse-
quent purchasers who knew its provisions.
The leading case in the field of equitable servitudes on 'land is
Tulk v. Moxhay.4 The English Court of Chancery laid down the prin-
ciple that equity will enforce an agreement to use or abstain from us-
ing land in a particular manner against any purchaser or other per-
son with notice of the restriction who attempts to use the land in vio-
lation of its terms, regardless of whether the agreement was a valid
covenant running with the land. Since this early decision, the doctrine
restrictions on the chattel itself, tying restrictions, and territorial restrictions. For
a discussion of these five types of restrictions see Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 948-50 (1928).
2346 P.2d 5o5 (Dist. Ct. Calif. 1959).
'The invoice signed by Vizcarra in accepting the goods read as follows: "To be
removed from jars, Caps, jars, and cases to be returned to Nadell 8: Co., Inc." Id. at
5o8.
'Phill. ch. 744, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
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of equitable servitudes upon land has been accepted and greatly ex-
panded by both English and American courts.5
The subjection of chattels to equitable servitudes did not meet
with such spontaneous approval. In 1928, Professor Chafee pointed
out that judges looked with disfavor on practically all attempts to
impose obligations upon successive owners of personal property be-
cause such restrictions are in restraint of trade, and they violate the
public policy favoring free alienability of chattels.6 By 1928, price
maintenance7 and tying restrictions,8 the two chief methods of creating
equitable servitudes, had been declared invalid; and only a few stray
decisions based on other grounds could be found in which courts had
enforced such restrictions on chattels.9 Therefore, at that time sup-
port for upholding the validity of an equitable servitude had to rest
on principle rather than authority. Chafee said in conclusion:
"At the close of my inquiry... I am much less convinced of
the desirability of equitable servitude than when I began.
Against the persuasive effect of analogous property interests
and the advantages of such restrictions to manufacturers and
to the marketing process must be offset'not only the economic
claims of consumers and independent wholesalers and retailers,
but also the immense judicial labor required for a satisfactory
development of. the operation and limits of the proposed de-
vice.... There is no such gap in general welfare as would be
occasioned by the rejection of equitable servitudes on land.
Until the need for similar servitudes on chattels becomes more
certain, they are not likely to acquire assured validity."
10
Soon after this appeared, there was a surprising about-face, aided
by Congress," in the field of price maintenance. Powerful lobbies
'See 3 Tiffany, Real Property 858-75 (3d ed. 1939), for a general discussion of
the subject of equitable servitudes showing their general acceptance as well as the
expansion of the original doctrine expressed in Tulk v. Moxhay.
OChafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1928).
7In John D. Park &- Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 19o7), Judge
Lurton declared that restrictions placed by a manufacturer on the resale price of his
product were unenforceable since they were in restraint of trade. This case was sub-
sequently followed by Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911). For a discussion of price maintenance cases before the passage of the Fair
Trade Laws, see Annot., 7 A.L.R. 449 (1920).
Sin United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), this type
of restriction was condemned for the same reason as price maintenance.
OChafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 1007-13 (1928).
"Id. at 1013.
21The Miller Tydings Act, ch. 690 tit. VIII, 5o Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1959), provides that nothing in the Sherman Anti-trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(189o), or the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914),
15 U.s.. § 41 (1935), shall render illegal contracts or agreements prescribing mini-
mum prices for the resale of a commodity, when contracts or agreements of that
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in almost every state secured the passage of fair trade laws which
legalized this type of restriction. 2 But outside of this well-managed
field, the cases concerning other types of equitable servitudes on chat-
Lels are in hopeless conflict.
After 1928 and before Nadell, there had been nine known at-
tempts to bind personal property by the use of equitable restrictions
other than those created by Congress. Five of these attempts were suc-
cessful, but only three of these cases actually turned on the legality of
the attempted restriction. Some of the courts, when faced with ques-
tions relating to equitable servitudes on chattels, apparently ignored
the matter and rested their decision on other grounds.' 3 On the other
hand, some restrictions have been upheld because both the property
and the interests involved were unique,14 such as the restrictions
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions under the law of the
state in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be trans-
ported for resale.
"See Annot., sg A.L.R.2d 1139 (1951), for a discussion and cases concerning
price maintenance under state Fair Trade Laws. See also Shulman, The Fair Trade
Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 Yale L.J. 607
(194o), and Lackskein, Refusal to Sell: A means of Achieving Resale Price Mainten-
ance in Non-Fair Trade Law States, 36 Texas L. Rev. 799 (s958) •
"In Barron G. Collier, Inc. v. Paddock, 37 Ariz. 194, 291 Pac. looo (ig3o), the
agreement by a traction company to let plaintiff control all advertising in its cars
was held not to bind the city, which acquired the property and was running
a municipal street railway. The court based its decision on technical considerations
concerning how and what kind of contract a municipality could enter into and
never considered the validity of the plaintiff's servitude. A lower Texas court re-
fused to enforce a tying restriction which would require owners of a certain filling
station to purchase only from a particular dealer. Montgomery v: Creager, 22 S.W.2d
463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). The holding is based upon the principle that the re-
striction was a personal contract between the plaintiff and the defendant's vendor
and not one that attaches to the property itself.
"In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937),
on facts identical to the Whiteman case in the text below, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania upheld the validity of an equitable servitude on a record stating
that it was not in restraint of trade and not so unreasonable as to be unenforceable
in equity. The court held that although in most cases the common law rules against
such restrictions on chattels would apply, this ancient distinction should not be
followed blindly in a modern era, but judges should use intelligent discretion in
deciding whether to enforce such a covenant. For a discussion of the Waring and
Whiteman decisions, see 2 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 85 (1940). In Capital Records, Inc.
v. Mercury Record Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955), the plaintiff was allowed
to enforce a territorial restriction giving him the exclusive right to make certain
records. The court, in upholding the servitude, simply stated that, under the New
York law, the owner of a literary property may, by negative covenant, subject its use
to certain restrictions when in the hands of remote assigns. In the third case, In re
Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 36 F.2d 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), modified in 48 F.2d 704
(2d Cir. 1931), a publisher's trustee in bankruptcy was not allowed to sell copy-
rights to other publishers free and clear of royalty agreements with the authors.
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imposed by an author or composer upon the use of his creation or
"literary property."'15
In two cases in which the decision turned squarely upon the valid-
ity of an equitable servitude, the courts refused to enforce such a re-
striction. In National Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried,16 the purchaser of an
amusement device was allowed to disregard his vendor's promise, which
purported to bind his assigns, that the device would not be used in
any place where other Skee-ball alleys were in operation. The decision
was based upon the traditional proposition that public policy is op-
posed to any limitation and restriction upon the alienability of per-
sonal property. In dictum, the court also said that a covenant, which
would be valid and run with land, will not run with or attach to a
mere chattel. In RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,'7 a printed notice on
a phonograph record did not prevent a purchaser from using it on
radio broadcasts. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, stated
that "restrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold are at
least prima facie invalid; they must be justified for some exceptional
reason, normally they are 'repugnant' to the transfer of title."' 8
In a few recent decisions, however, equitable servitudes on chattels
have been upheld and enforced by the use of an analogy to real prop-
erty principles. An equitable servitude on a juke box was accepted
without qualification in Pratte v. Balatsos,19 which is probably the
The restriction apparently was upheld as a matter of course, the decision being
based on contract principles. Though this case concerns literary property, it has
been cited for the proposition that equitable servitudes on all kinds of chattels are
enforceable. See 45 Harv. L. Rev. 586 (1932), which says that this decision ex-
tended the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels beyond any previous authority.
'5"Literary property," 'as the term is used here, refers to the right to ex-
clude others from making some use of the expressed thoughts of the author. "Literary
property means either the interest of an author in his words or the corporeal prop-
erty in which an intellectual production is embodied." Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d
715, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (1956). For other definitions of the phrase "literary property,"
see 25 Words & Phrases 398 (194o).
"Gio N.J. Eq. 18, 158 Atl. 736 (1932).
'114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). See note 4 supra, and the discussion of the Waring
case. The courts here stated that the Waring decision would not be followed.
',14 F.2d at 89.
'9113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955). For discussion of the Pratte case, see Chafee, The
Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 1250 (1956). See also In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., supra note 14, and
Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, Inc., 265 F.2d 6g
(5 th Cir. 1959). In the latter, defendant West India Company sold a vessel to one
Owens, restricting its use for mo years with a $io,ooo penalty for noncompliance.
Owens later sold the vessel to Tropical Marine Enterprises with a similar provision.
The plaintiff financed the sale and took a mortgage on the vessel. Tropical Marine
Enterprises went bankrupt and the plaintiff attempted to sell the mortgaged vessel
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outstanding example of enforcing such a restriction. There contracts
between plaintiff and defendant's vendor, binding upon assigns, gave
Pratte the right to supply and service juke boxes in Larochelle's
property. The defendant knew of the covenant when he purchased.
In allowing this restriction, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated:
"Equitable restrictions are recognized in this jurisdiction and held to
be binding upon the purchaser of the servient tenement with notice."20
Every case or other authority relied on by the court involved an
equitable servitude on land.
In Nadell the California court, though it discussed at some length
decisions directly concerning equitable servitudes on chattels, followed
the decision of Pratte v. Balatsos and based its result on an analogy to
real property principles. It is submitted, however, that by the use of
this analogy the California court, like many others dealing with this
subject, has avoided facing the real problem presented.
Courts have found equitable servitudes upon land desirable, and
the policy considerations behind their acceptance have often been
stated.2 ' These considerations, however, do not suffice to support the
validity of similar restrictions on chattels since the latter type of re-
strictions produces an entirely different effect on the public. As stated
by Professor Chafee, in a comment on the Pratte case:
"The big point is that the imposition of a novel burden, either
on land or a chattel or both, ought not to depend solely on the
free of restriction. The court upheld the restriction stating that the plaintiff, in
order to get relief under the circumstances shown, had to produce more than the dry
as dust technical distinction between restrictions on chattels and realty. The court
held that under this situation where the mortgagee with knowledge of the covenant
now undertakes to deprive the beneficiary of its benefits and at the same time tries
to impose upon a third party, with whom it arranged to make the mortgage, the
burden of the heavy loss which follows the breach, "equity will prevent [plaintiff]
from taking this plainly inequitable, if not unconscionable, course by holding it
estopped or otherwise bound by it in equity." Id. at 620. This decision, however, as
the dissent points out, appears to turn more upon the fact situation presented than
the validity of equitable servitudes on chattels in general.
!'i13 A.2d at 494-5.
2'Though equitable restrictions are in marked contrast with the strong legal
rules against restraint on alienability, equity courts in the nineteenth century began to
enforce such restrictions because they resembled easements and covenants running
with the land, already proven desirable, and because in many instances this new kind
of restriction, though unrecognized by the law courts, appeared to be an aid in
developing neighborhoods in a fair and satisfactory manner. Thus, these restrictions
aided public policy since there was a lack in both England and America of systematic
town planning or rational schemes for the development and control of real property.
See Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use of Land, 14
Va. L. Rev. 419 (1928); Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers
to a Contract, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 291 (1918).
i96o]
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will' of the parties. The validity or invalidity of the burden
they want to create ought to depend on considerations of public
policy. Do business needs make it desirable to create this novel
burden? Does its enforcement involve such grave possibilities
of annoyance, inconvenience and useless expenditures of money
that it should not be allowed? In other words, is the game
worth the candle?" 22
By applying real property principles to chattels, the California
court has set a precedent for upholding the validity of equitable servi-
tudes on chattels without even considering the effect on the general
economy.23 Just because equitable restrictions on land are desirable,
it does not necessarily follow that similar restrictions on chattels will
be beneficial. The policy considerations are entirely different and
should be judged according to their respective merits.
Having decided that the equitable servitude in Nadell was valid,
the court was still faced with another issue: whether only the producers
of the goods can create such a servitude.24 The court held that Nadell
could create such a servitude since he had a "good will" 25 interest in
-Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes And Chat-
tels, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 1258 (1956).
'The court apparently chose to ignore several of the fundamental differences
between personal and real property by its analogy. Probably the outstanding one, and
certainly a relevant consideration, is that land remains in the same hands for com-
paratively long periods of time and is transferred only after an elaborate title
investigation. Chattels, on the other hand, are sold so rapidly that such restrictions
interfering with quick transfers are undesirable. Notice of restrictions on land are
easily proved because of recording, but to prove such notice in the case of chattels
would lead to frequent litigation since this question will usually be a matter
of proof for the jury.
21"As to the final point, that a restrictive covenant on the use of personal prop-
erty may only be created by the producer of the goods, such claim overlooks the
fact that the good will of a business, declared to be "property," is not limited to the
field of Manufacturing .... In the present case there was indirect, if not direct,
evidence that respondent would be irreparably injured in the expectation of con-
tinued public patronage .... specifically as it concerned the Southern Pacific, if
the restriction was not enforced. Where, by nonperformance of a contract a person
will be greatly embarrassed and impeded in his business plans, or involved in a
loss of profits which a jury cannot estimate with any degree of certainty, equity
will intervene." 346 P.2d 5o5, 512 (1959).
-The term "good will" has many diffierent meanings. Good will is property
and is recognized and protected by the law as such. Mann v. Fisher, 51 F. Supp. 550
(W.D. Mo. 1943). The term, as used here, may be defined as the probability that old
customers will resort to the same place or buy the same product. "'Good Will' is
said to be the favor which the management of a business wins from the public
and the probability that old customers will continue their patronage and resort to
the old place." Liquidators of Nicholson Pub. Co. v. E. S. Upton Printing Co. 152
La. 270, 93 So. 91, 93 (1922). For other definitions of the term "good will," see
i8A Words and Phrases 21o (1956).
